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BUKTI, PENENTU DAN AKIBAT DARI GELEMBUNG HARGA ASET: KES 
MALAYSIA DAN SINGAPURA 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
 
Gelembung harga asset adalah suatu fenomena yang telah berlaku berkurun 
lamanya. Fenomena ini boleh menyebabkan kesan negatif ke atas ekonomi 
sesebuah negara sewaktu pembentukan dan juga semasa fasa 
keruntuhannya. Isu mengenai pembentukan gelembung adalah berkenaan 
salah peruntukan sumber-sumber ekonomi yang sememangnya terhad 
kepada aktiviti spekulasi yang mengerumuni aktiviti produktif. Apabila 
gelembung itu runtuh, kesannya lebih terasa kepada masyarakat 
keseluruhannya. Walau bagaimanapun, para penyelidik masih lagi 
membahaskan kewujudannya secara sejarah, apakah yang menyebabkan 
pembentukkannya, dan apakah akibatnya terhadap negara dan juga 
masyarakat setempat. 
 
 Kajian ini ingin memberikan pemahaman yang lebih mendalam ke 
atas ketiga-tiga persoalan tersebut. Suatu pendekatan berbilang ujian telah 
digunakan bagi menentukan kewujudan gelembung tersebut. Dengan 
menggunakan hipotesis ketidak-stabilan kewangan seperti yang 
dicadangkan oleh Hyman Misky dan juga kaedah ‘polynomial distributed lag’, 
beberapa pembolehubah yang menonjol telah dikenalpasti sebagai 
mempunyai ciri-ciri penjelasan mengenai penyebaran gelembung harga aset 
di Malaysia dan Singapura. Dalam kes penyebaran gelembung harga saham, 
kedua-duanya iaitu pertumbuhan Keluaran Dalam Negara Kasar (KDNK) dan 
aliran modal adalah  pembolehubah penjelas yang konsisten dan signifikan. 
 xxii 
Bagi gelembung hartanah, kadar faedah sebenar, pertumbuhan KKDN 
sebenar dan proksi gelembung harga saham adalah indikator utama.  
Dengan kesemua indikator utama di dalam tangan, para pelabur dan pihak 
berkuasa /kerajaan boleh melaksanakan pengukur yang bersesuaian bagi 
memantau pembolehubah menonjol untuk membaiki kesan pembentukan 
dan keruntuhan gelembung tersebut. 
 
 Akhir sekali, dengan menggunakan pendekatan ‘Granger causality’, 
gelembung harga aset secara keseluruhannya didapati mempunyai kesan 
‘uni-variate’ ke atas aktiviti ekonomi sebenar apabila diukur dengan 
penggunaan dan pelaburan. Ini menunjukkan bahawa kerajaan dan bank 
negara mungkin telah menggunapakai polisi seperti polisi kewangan yang 
bergantung kepada keadaan, pujukan moral, penyebaran maklumat 
penilaian yang lebih baik, penyediaan pangkalan data kewangan, polisi 
kitaran bertentangan dan revolusi pasaran kewangan dengan peralatan 
pengurusan risiko yang lebih baik. Walaupun sesetengah dari tindakan ini 
adalah kontroversi namun adalah penting bagi pendemokrasian kewangan 
ini dijalankan oleh kedua-dua negara untuk mempromosikan pelakuan 
pelaburan yang bersesuaian tanpa bahaya risiko. 
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EVIDENCE, DETERMINANTS, AND CONSEQUENCES OF ASSET PRICE 
BUBBLES: THE CASE OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Asset price bubbles have been a phenomenon that has occurred for 
centuries. This phenomenon can result in a negative impact on a country’s 
economy during the build-up and collapse phase. The issue with a bubble 
build-up is the misallocation of scarce economic resources in speculative 
activities which crowd out investment in productive activities. When the 
bubble collapses, its effect is even greater on society as a whole. 
Researchers nevertheless are still debating its existence even historically, 
what its causes are, and whether it will has any consequential effects on 
countries generally and society at large. 
 
This study seeks to provide further insight on these three questions. A 
multi-test approach was employed to determine the existence of bubbles. 
Using the financial instability hypothesis proposed by Hyman Minsky and a 
polynomial distributed lag approach; several salient variables were identified 
to have explanatory properties on the propagation of asset price bubbles in 
Malaysia and Singapore. In the case of stock price bubbles propagation, both 
real GDP growth and capital flows are consistently significant explanatory 
variables. As for real estate bubbles, real interest rates, real GDP growth, 
and the stock market bubble proxy are leading indicators. With these leading 
indicators in hand, both investors and government authorities can implement 
appropriate monitoring measures on these salient variables to ameliorate the 
effects of bubble build-up and its collapse. 
 xxiv 
 Lastly, using the Granger causality approach, asset price bubbles in 
general have uni-variate effects on real economic activity measured by 
consumption and investment. This indicates that government and central 
bank may undertake policies such as monetary policy dependent on the 
situation, moral suasion, better dissemination of valuation information, 
creating individual financial databases, countercyclical policies, and 
revolutionising financial markets with improved risk management tools. 
Although some of these measures albeit are controversial, it is imperative 
that democratisation of finance is undertaken by both countries in order to 
promote appropriate investment behaviour but without the downside risk.  
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Background of the Study 
 The stock market is pivotal to the health of a country’s economy. This 
is more so in Malaysia as it is a small and open economy and Singapore, 
which is a trading nation with limited natural resources. Speculation and 
extreme volatility are therefore dangers, which may not necessarily lead to 
economic downturns. The Malaysian and Singaporean stock markets and 
real estate markets have suffered their fair share of booms and busts. 
 The Malaysian stock market has experienced seven boom-bust cycles 
since its inception. The first was the crash of 1973 that lasted for nearly two 
years. Neoh (1989) attributed the stock market rise to speculation by first-
time investors as the main cause of the boom and the subsequent crash. 
Most investors were mainly civil servants who were investing in the stock 
market for the first time. The lack of alternative investments (the three 
months fixed deposit rate at that time was five per cent) caused the money in 
circulation to be channelled into the local bourse and the bull-run took off in 
January 1971 and reached its peak on 13 February 1973 (Neoh, 1989). 
 At that time the Singaporean and Malaysian stock markets were 
interlinked. The Straits Times Industrial Index peaked at 611 points recording 
a cumulative increase of over 472 per cent over the two year period. Share 
prices had reached dizzying heights. For example, one thousand shares of 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC) was priced at RM50,000 at 
its height. This sum was equivalent to the selling price of two terrace houses 
at that point in time (Neoh, 1989). Prices subsequently collapsed and 
 2 
OCBC’s stock price crashed to RM3.58 from a high of RM50.00 per share 
which is a decrease of almost over 93 per cent. 
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Figure 1.1    Nominal Kuala Lumpur stock exchange composite index (KLCI). 
 
 As can be seen from Figure 1.1, the second was the crash of 1981, 
which ended after 16 months. A less severe downturn occurred in the 
beginning of 1984 and reached its trough only in May 1986. The next crash in 
1987 coincided with the U.S. stock market financial meltdown of that year 
lasting for a period of almost nine months (Neoh, 1989). After the 
extraordinary boom of 1993, the market again headed south in 1994 and 
moved upwards for the next three years leading to a sharp fall during the 
1997 Asian financial crisis whereby between July 1997 and mid-January 
1998, the all ordinaries index of the KLSE fell by over 65 per cent, wiping off 
almost US$225 billion of market capitalization which was the biggest stock 
market plunge among the five “crisis” countries (Athukorala, 1998). The 
 3 
market recovered from the 1997 Asian financial crisis with price appreciations 
from a historical low of 302.91 points at end of August 1998 whereby the 
KLCI almost reached the 1000 points mark in February 2000 only to suffer a 
setback after that year. 
 Neoh (1989) has noted that the Malaysian stock market has 
progressively been more speculative in nature with each passing boom and 
bust. In the first half of 2005, the stock market was jolted by the limit-down 
phenomena which led to a collapse in prices of several second-liners and 
third-liners. This had even prompted the Malaysian Securities Commission 
(SC) to launch a probe to investigate these disruptive movements in share 
prices ("Limit-down trades on Bursa persist," 2005).  
 It is therefore important to investors to ascertain as to where does 
fundamental value end and speculation begin. Investors cannot simply rely 
solely on research reports by research houses and the stock picks which are 
heavily covered by the media. It was this sense of confidence which led to 
overconfidence in the durability of the uptrend in stock market (Neoh, 1989). 
Prior to the Malaysian stock market crash of 1981, most stock recommendations 
from brokers and stock market forecasts depicted by the media were bullish in 
nature. There were few if any dissenting voices (Neoh, 1989). In fact, due to the 
recent trend in extreme volatility in prices and trading volume, Bursa Malaysia 
has since 18 July, 2005 made available to the public its queries to companies 
whose share prices depict unusual activity and whose trading depict unusual 
volume. From 18 July, 2005 to 19 October, 2005, a total of 21 notices have 
been disseminated through the Bursa Malaysia website 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/media_centre/media_releases.html. 
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This is an average of seven notices a month. The goes to show how important 
it is for investors to be knowledgeable about speculation in specific firms as 
well as speculation in the overall market. 
 Singapore too has not escaped from the tell-tale signs of asset price 
appreciation and its subsequent bursting. There has been nine cycles of 
boom to bust from 1973 to 2006 with the Straits Times Index (this is a 
Datastream calculated index) rising from a collapse in the mid-1970s to reach 
a peak of 128.14 points in early July 1981 which was not far off the value in 
early 1973 (See Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2 Nominal Singapore Straits Times Index and nominal implied 
dividends (Datastream calculated). 
 
The index subsequently collapsed to a low 76.23 points in the month 
of September 1982. This was a dramatic 40.51 per cent reduction in market 
capitalisation. As documented on the KLCI, the Straits Times Index (STI) 
mirrored the rise and fall of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) by 
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hitting a peak of 185.40 points in early October 1987 and thereafter 
collapsing 102.33 points in a mere four months. The STI recovered to reach 
a peak of 188.54 in August 1990. 
 Although there were several peaks and troughs after that, the STI 
nevertheless climbed steadily to reach a record value of 247.04 points in mid-
1996. The onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis led to a collapse of the STI 
to158.09 points. This was a collapse of 36 per cent in value. This is much 
less than the collapse suffered by the KLCI. The STI recovered dramatically 
after the crisis and hit a record of that time of 335.37 points in January 2000. 
This was 112.13 per cent increase since the collapse during the financial 
crisis. This could be attributed to the fact the Singaporean economy depends 
much on the manufacturing sector especially semiconductors. This rise was 
related to the dot com boom which was also known as NASDAQ bubble. The 
post-millennium collapse of the STI also mirrored the collapse of the 
NASDAQ as well. The STI dropped to 173.37 in October 2001 which 
amounts to a 48.3 per cent decline within a period of almost two years. This 
incidentally is the largest drop ever recorded. The STI has since recovered 
and has gone on to record its highest ever value of 356.07 points in May, 
2006. One wonders whether the STI is currently in a bubble. 
Boom-bust cycles have also occurred in other asset markets. There 
were two documented instances of property price appreciations from 1971 to 
1973 and 1979 to 1982. After both these appreciations, the property market 
collapsed (Ratnam, 1983). Palma (2000) observes a significant run up in real 
estate prices from 1988 to 1995. Starting for a base of 100 in quarter one of 
1988, the Malaysian real estate index increased to almost 600 points at end 
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of third quarter of 1994. There was a slight adjustment subsequently as the 
index eased to below 400 points in the fourth quarter of 1995. The 
liberalization of capital in-flows, low mortgage rates, and little movement in 
the stock market as compared to the boom of 1993 set in motion another run-
up in real estate prices. The index increased from below 400 points at the 
end of the last quarter of 1995 to touch a peak of slightly above 900 points in 
the third quarter of 1998. The index eased on the onset of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. 
 Several stylized facts can be seen from a view of Singapore’s property 
price index (PPI). The PPI had increased significantly from the period of 1978 
and peaked in 1996, quarter two. This was probably due to the liberalisation 
policies carried out by the Singaporean government during the 1990s and 
coupled with excess demand for housing which boosted the market 
(Bardhan, Datta, Edelstein, & Lum, 2003). There was also an increase in the 
supply of land parcels as the Singaporean government sold 99 year leases in 
view of the ever increasing economic affluence of its citizens that caused 
many to fall out of the eligibility bracket of public housing (Chua, 2000). 
Prices started to fall well before the 1997 Asian financial crises which may 
denote that house price is a possible leading indicator of financial crises. 
Prices hit bottom at the end of 1998 and recovered somewhat up to the year 
2000, only to gradually taper off to the present. 
 The dramatic collapse of the stock market in 1997 and the physical 
glut in office space and abandoned residential projects are fresh on the 
minds of investors. However, there is a need to look at the behaviour of asset 
prices over the long-term and identify periods of irrational exuberance 
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because after all, most investors have short memories and may repeat the 
same mistakes in future.  
The need to understand the behaviour of asset prices is all the more 
important with shorter business cycles emerging in recent times. An analysis 
of the asset price bubble phenomenon should be a comprehensive one. 
There is no point in only examining one aspect of asset price bubbles. A 
comprehensive analysis would therefore give investors an overall view as 
summed up by Shiller (2003). 
Although, some central bankers have advocated that the primary role 
of the central bank is to ensure price stability, others have argued that central 
bankers need to ensure financial stability as well (Posen, 2006; Roubini, 
2006). This ongoing debate has not abated and the importance of a 
satisfactory analysis of whether this phenomenon occurs in Malaysia and 
Singapore is therefore all the more imperative. It is not enough to spot the 
phenomenon but also important to understand in what conditions does it 
propagate, and what are its effects on the economy. This allows investors 
regardless of whether they are individual investors or institutional investors to 
make better investment decisions by incorporating some of the techniques 
that will be discussed in this thesis. 
The situation in the global finance arena lately had been one of great 
uncertainty. All this has been triggered by advent of new financial products 
like sub-prime mortgages and credit default swaps (CDS). The unravelling of 
the real estate bubble in the US has reverberated in financial markets around 
the world. The extent of collapse in real estate prices in the US which initially 
was seen as a country-specific problem and its effect on global financial 
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markets have surprised many financial analysts and economists alike. This 
may however reflect the reality of the new global financial order where far 
flung countries’ financial markets have become increasingly integrated. 
 The analysis will be based on a two-country comparison. The 
countries chosen are Malaysia and Singapore. The choice of these two 
countries is based on the fact that a priori, both countries are linked 
economically as well as historical. So, the analysis of both countries should 
hypothetically yield similar results. Conducting a two-country analysis would 
also strengthen the robustness of the results with regards to the variables 
used. 
 
1.1 Problem Statements 
 Asset price bubbles are suspected to have far reaching effects on a 
country’s economy. How an asset is valued at the present moment or in the 
future influences major economic and social policy decisions that affect not 
only investors but also society at large, and even the world. If asset prices at 
present or in the future are exaggerated, then as a society, we may invest too 
much in business start-ups (as for example during the Internet boom in the 
U.S.) and expansions, and too little in infrastructure, education, and other 
forms of human capital which improves the productivity and GDP of a 
country’s economy. This misallocation of resources is even worse during a 
real estate market boom such as the one recently experienced by the U.S. 
economy. A property boom does nothing to boost long-term growth unlike the 
Internet boom which left a modern capital stock which still continues to yield 
productivity gains ("The great thrift shift," 2005). 
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 If we think an asset is worth much more than its intrinsic value, we 
may make economic decisions that may be detrimental. We may become 
complacent in maintaining our savings rate, funding our pension plans, and 
instituting proper social security insurance. Shiller (2005) points out that most 
investors seem to view the asset market as a force of nature by itself. They 
do not fully realize that they themselves, as a group, determine the level of 
the market and its volatility. Institutional investors like the Employees 
Provident Fund of Malaysia, the Armed Forces Provident Fund, and the 
Central Provident Fund which are huge investors in capital markets need to 
safeguard the interests of its contributors by implementing appropriate 
investment policies based on in-depth analysis of asset prices. 
 We need to ascertain that the price level of the stock market and the 
property market today, tomorrow or for that matter any other day reflects 
sensible economic reality, just as we need to know what is held in our bank 
accounts. The proper valuation of these asset classes will determine the 
current and future wealth of us as individuals and a country’s economy as a 
whole. 
 Research of asset price bubbles especially on real estate bubbles is 
especially sparse in the context of Malaysia and Singapore. Fewer studies 
have been conducted on the determinants of asset price bubble let alone on 
the consequences towards a country’s economy. This study seeks to fulfil 
that gap and analyse asset price bubbles in its entirety, from its formation to 
its consequences towards the decision making framework of the individual 
and also the firm. 
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1.2 Research Objectives 
The purposes of this research are as listed below. 
• To investigate empirically the existence of asset price bubbles within 
various asset classes in the Malaysian and Singaporean economies 
which will be the basis for other research objectives.  
• To identify the determinants of asset price bubbles.  
• To examine the effects of stock price bubbles and real estate bubbles 
on the economy. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 There are three research questions this study seeks to answer. First, 
is there any evidence of asset price bubbles within different asset classes in 
the Malaysian and Singaporean context? Second, what are the determinants 
of asset price bubbles within the Malaysian and Singaporean context? Third, 
what are the possible consequences of a stock price bubble and a real estate 
bubble on Malaysia and Singapore with specific emphasis on consumption 
and investment?  
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
 Asset price bubbles are known to have some effects on the economy. 
However, there have been times when there has been no effect at all. For 
example, Mishkin and White (2003) found little stress on the financial system 
due to stock market crashes in the U.S. in 1903, 1940, 1946, 1962, and 
2000. On the other hand, episodes where crashes put stress on the financial 
system include 1929 and 1987. There were also sharp increases in interest 
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rates spreads associated with the crashes of 1907, 1930-33, 1937, and 
1973-74. By unravelling the factors that lead to and amplify asset price 
bubbles, policymakers will be better equipped to deal with any destabilizing 
effects of asset price bubbles on an economy. This study attempts to 
synthesize the various strands of analysis to offer policymakers a more 
complete picture of what asset bubbles are, how we might identify them – 
and more importantly – whether it has any destructive effects on the financial 
system and a country’s economy. 
 Trichet (2003) offers two reasons why asset prices and wealth effects 
may have grown over the last decade. First, changes in asset valuations, 
which were mainly driven by the new economy stock prices from the mid 
1990s and their subsequent collapse in 2000, have been dramatic. Second, 
these changes have significantly influenced private spending more than past 
asset price movements did because there has been an increasing 
percentage of share ownership observed in a number of industrialized 
countries. 
 It should be noted that the strength of economies such as Malaysia 
and Singapore depend on the smooth functioning of the financial system. 
The difficulty and the inconclusiveness of economists on how to identify an 
asset price bubble and its consequences will be noted in the literature review 
following. Therefore, this study seeks to add new insights in the workings of 
the financial system of a small open economy like Malaysia and a trading 
economy like Singapore, whereby both are highly dependent on foreign 
capital inflow and investment. The goal of the Malaysian government is to 
promote the country as a premier financial centre. As for the Singaporean 
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government, the goal is maintain their country’s position as a premier 
financial centre. This makes this study all the more imperative to 
understanding a phenomenon that has plagued most developed countries. 
 
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
 The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follows. In the 
second chapter, the focus is on an overview of the asset pricing theory and 
how it relates in particular to the stock market and real estate. The next 
chapter looks at the empirical evidence of asset price bubbles with focus on 
both developed countries and developing countries. A notable difference 
would be the nature of the tests used to determine asset price bubbles which 
results in contradictory and conflicting outcomes on the same set of data in 
some cases. 
 Previous studies on the determinants of asset price bubbles are 
discussed next. The discussion then focuses on the consequences of these 
bubbles. Finally, the chapter closes with a brief overview on the policy 
measures that have been described by previous published works. 
Controversy is abundant in this section. 
The next chapter discusses the research methodology to be used to 
answer all the research questions posed and to provide the proper empirical 
tests for testing the various hypotheses put forth. A detailed description of the 
data collected as well as its sources is explained as clearly as possible.  
Chapter 5 and penultimate chapter presents the findings on the 
second and third research questions posed which are what are the 
determinants of asset price bubbles and what are the consequences of asset 
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price bubbles. Chapter 6 closes out with a discussion on the policy 
implications and measure government authorities or central banks could 
undertake in light of formation of an asset price bubble or the aftermath of its 
collapse. 
Finally, the last chapter presents the summary and conclusion 
focusing on the salient points of the findings, limitations of the present 
research, possible ideas for future research, and ends with an overall 
conclusion of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 OVERVIEW OF ASSET PRICE BUBBLES 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 In this chapter, we first explore the various definitions of asset bubbles 
which are all centred on a common theme. The next section looks at asset 
price bubbles in the historical sense and highlights the gullibility of investors 
over the centuries. The modern episodes of asset price bubbles are 
discussed next. This reinforces the point that investors have short memories 
of pain of a price collapse. 
 
2.1 Definition of Asset Bubbles 
 The word bubble is essentially something that grows bigger and bigger 
due to an injection of air and water for example. Its bursting could be due to 
the inability of the object to sustain further intake of water or air. The analogy 
of a common bubble can be translated into asset prices as well. 
 The late Charles P. Kindleberger (2000), author of the famous Mania, 
Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises defines a bubble as “an 
upward movement over an extended range that then implodes.” Kindleberger 
elaborated further on the definition of bubbles in the New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Money and Finance: 
A bubble may be loosely defined as a sharp rise in price of an 
asset or a range of assets in a continuous process, with the 
initial rise generating expectations of further rises and attracting 
new buyers – generally speculators interested in profits from 
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trading in the asset rather than its use or earning capacity 
(p.243). 
 This definition relates to a cycle of positive reinforcement. As long as 
there is positive reinforcement that asset prices will be on the rise, more 
players will enter the market in the hope of getting out in time by selling the 
assets that have risen to the next person. This is also known as the greater 
fool theory, which is usually very popular during the immature phase of a 
stock market’s development (Neoh, 1989) although a recent study has shown 
this behaviour to be also prevalent in the U.S. which was a developed market 
during the 1999-2000 Internet bubble (Dhar & Goetzmann, 2006). 
 Garber (2000) has added more substance to the definition of a bubble 
by linking asset price movements to fundamentals. Fundamentals refer to 
those economic factors such as cash flows and discount rates that in tandem 
determine the price of any asset. He stated, “The definition of bubble more 
often used in economic research is that part of asset price movements that is 
unexplainable based on what we call fundamentals” (p. 4). 
 Rosser (1991) gives more depth with regards to the discussion on 
fundamentals when defining a bubble. A speculative bubble “exists when the 
price of something does not equal its market fundamentals for some period of 
time for reasons other than random shocks. [Fundamentals] is usually argued 
to be the long-run equilibrium consistent with a general equilibrium” (p. 107). 
 Shiller (2005) approaches the bubble definition from an investor 
behavioural viewpoint whereby a speculative bubble is “an unsustainable 
increase in prices brought on by investors’ buying behaviour rather than by 
genuine fundamental information about value” (p. 5). 
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 Siegel (2003) proposed a somewhat operational definition of an asset 
market bubble focusing on the deviation between expected returns and 
actual returns over a certain time period. He defines a bubble (or a negative 
bubble) as a period of rising (or falling) prices in an asset market at time t if it 
can be shown that the realized return of the asset over a given future time 
period (which is defined by the duration of the asset) can be shown to be 
inconsistent, i.e., more than two standard deviations from the expected 
return, given the historical risk and return characteristics of that asset at time 
t. 
 In this study, a careful distinction must be made on the exact concept 
of asset bubbles, which will be used to govern the analysis of the results. The 
focus is on asset bubbles, which propagate in the presence of rational 
investors. This means that asset bubbles can coexist within a rational 
expectations environment. Another name that is frequently used is a rational 
growing bubble. Therefore, this somewhat arbitrarily distinguishes the 
rational bubble from fads, sunspots, and information bubbles. Camerer 
(1989) defines these other phenomenon succinctly. 
 In summary, although there are various definitions espoused by 
different economists, one ubiquitous theme is recognizable which is, growth 
of a bubble requires positive feedback from initial investments. A bubble 
cannot grow unless there are some initial gains received by the primary 
investors. Speculative investing with no regards whatsoever for fundamentals 
occur when secondary investors enter the fray or when primary investors re-
invest their earnings. The definition of speculative bubbles adopted in this 
study is based on Kindleberger’s bubble definition as listed in the New 
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Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance. In this study, rational speculative 
bubbles are examined. 
 
2.2 Asset Price Bubbles from a Historical Perspective: Some Classic 
Examples 
 Asset price bubbles are not something of a new phenomenon. In fact, 
there have been well-documented cases from as early as the 17th century. 
The earliest was known as the tulipmania. The Netherlands became a centre 
of cultivation and development of new tulip varieties after the tulip’s entry into 
Europe from Turkey in the mid-1500s. The wealthy and professional growers 
created a market for rare varieties in which bulbs sold at very high prices. For 
example, the Semper Augustus bulb sold for 2000 guilders in 1625, which is 
equivalent to an amount of gold worth US$16,000 at US$400 an ounce. 
Garber (1990) describes the tulipmania frenzy in detail: 
By 1636, the rapid price rises attracted speculators and prices 
of many varieties surged upward from November 1636 through 
January 1637. In February 1637, prices suddenly collapsed, 
and bulbs could not be sold at 10 per cent of their peak values. 
By 1739, the prices of most prized bulbs of the mania had fallen 
to no more than 0.1 guilder.  This was 1/200 of 1 per cent of 
Semper Augustus’s peak price. (pp. 37-38) 
 This speculative mania involved practically the whole country so much 
so that productive activities were neglected as the grip of tulipmania took 
over and governed even the common peoples’ lives. The collapse of the tulip 
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market in the Netherlands led to economic distress and the beginning of the 
declining imperial power of the Dutch across the world.  
 Britain became the major economic superpower after the decline of 
the Dutch towards the middle of the 18th century. Nevertheless, asset price 
bubbles did not escape Britain. The infamous London-based South Sea 
Company came up with an ingenious plan to take over Britain’s national debt 
in return for interest and sole trading rights to the South Seas (South 
America) and hence, in theory, to the treasures of the gold and silver mines 
in Peru and Mexico. 
 In actuality, the control of the trading rights was in the possession of 
Spain, which made it difficult for the company to generate a profit. Moreover, 
Spain allowed the South Sea Company to send only one ship a year to trade 
with South America (Neoh, 1989). Nevertheless, speculators frantically bid 
up the share price. It rocketed from £130 to £1,000 within seven months, and 
then collapsed abruptly, leaving many investors ruined and landing the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day in prison. Figure 2.1 chronicles the 
fortunes of the South Sea Company. 
 Another bubble that was closely related to the South Sea bubble was 
the Mississippi bubble, which occurred in France. The scheme emerged in 
the context of the monetary theory and system derived by John Law. It 
involved monetary expansion using paper currency, which he argued would 
expand real commerce on a permanent basis, which in return would increase 
the demand for the new currency sufficiently to preclude a rise in prices. 
 Garber (1990) chronicles specifically the details of the Mississippi 
bubble: 
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… he quickly convinced the Regent to permit him to open a 
conventional, note-issuing bank in June 1716, the Banque 
Generale. In August 1717, Law organized the Compagnie 
d’Occident to take over the monopoly on trade with Louisiana 
and on trade in Canadian beaver skins. To finance the 
company, Law took subscriptions on shares to be paid partly in 
cash but mostly in government debt. He then converted the 
government’s debt into rentes, offering the government an 
interest rate reduction. (p. 42) 
 
Figure 2.1  South Sea company stock price (in log scale). 
 The value of shares in Law’s company rose dramatically as Law’s 
empire expanded. Shares in the company started at around 150 livres 
tournois (the French unit of account at that time) per share in January 1719. 
At the end of that year, share prices reached 10,000 livres. The market 
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became so seductive that people from the working class started to delve in 
its shares. 
 The weak spot in Law’s scheme was his willingness to issue more 
bank notes to fund the purchase of shares in the company. Stock price 
began falling in January 1720 as some investors sold shares to turn capital 
gains into gold. In order to stop the sell-off, Law restricted any payment in 
gold that was more than 100 livres. Law devalued shares in the company in 
several stages during 1720 and this allowed Law’s enemies to take control of 
the company by confiscating the shares of investors who could not prove 
they had actually paid for their shares with real assets rather than credit. By 
September 1721, share prices dropped to 150 livres, which was the original 
price at which the shares were sold for (Knight, 2002). 
 Moving closer to the 20th century, business optimism in the United 
States picked up after World War I. This was due to new inventions like the 
car and the radio, which were changing peoples’ lives as well as the shape of 
the country’s economy. There was hope and confidence in the stock market 
and in people’s ability to get rich with little or no effort leading to much 
speculation. Elaborate financial instruments that had no real value other than 
the inflated paper profit fuelled intense speculation. The bubble built up until 
in October 1929 when the frenzy on Wall Street ended culminating in a 19.6 
per cent fall of the Dow Jones index for that month. In the following month, 
the index fell a further 22 per cent. As the consequence of the 1929 Great 
Crash, the U.S. economy went into a depression, which spread across the 
globe, and lasted for several years. 
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 Galbraith’s (1971) authoritative account of this episode in the Great 
Crash, 1929 succinctly points out that the experience of 1929 burned so 
deeply into national consciousness. Numerous legislative laws were passed 
after 1929 to make securities speculation more honest and, it was hoped, 
more readily restrained. However, in the recent times, it can be seen that 
none of these laws were a perfect safeguard. Figure 2.2 shows the 
movement of the Dow Jones Industrial Index before and after the crash of 
1929. 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Dow Jones Industrial Average 1921-1932 (log scale). 
 The recurrences of speculative excesses in widely differing 
environments suggest that it is, at best, a product of human nature (Simon, 
2003). Based on the descriptions of the bubbles above, the nature of the 
speculative manias usually began with sound economic activities. 
Nevertheless, the herd instinct forged ahead as irrationality took over from 
rationality. In other words, an individual could be acting rationally, but the 
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market as a whole could be at the same time, irrational. The next section will 
focus on recent asset price bubbles and the controversies surrounding the 
existence of asset price bubbles. 
 
2.3 Recent Cases of Asset Price Bubbles 
 Mishkin and White (2003), document significant aggregate price 
increases just before the collapse of the U.S. stock market in what is now 
known as the crash of October 1987. On October 19, the Dow Jones suffered 
a 22.6 per cent decline, and for the month, the index was down 23.2 per cent. 
When measured on the S & P 500, the market fell 12.1 per cent in October 
and 12.5 per cent in November. Remarkably, the pattern of the rise and fall 
mimicked the rise and fall of the market for 1926-1929.  
 Japan’s bubble economy of the late 1980s was also an example of the 
excesses of asset price bubbles. Among asset prices, what exhibited the 
most rapid rise initially were stock prices. The Nikkei 225 began accelerating 
in 1986 and the index hit a peak of Yen 38,915 at the end of 1989, 3.1 times 
higher than the level at the time of the Plaza Agreement in September 1986 
(Yen 12,598). Then stock prices fell sharply to Yen 14,309 in August 1992, 
more than 60 per cent below the peak (Okina, Shirakawa, & Shiratsuka, 
2001). French and Poterba (1991) tried to rationalize the possibility that the 
high actual price earnings ratio (P/E) observed on Japanese stocks during 
this period could be due to differing accounting practices between U.S. firms 
and Japanese firms. Although it was found that the P/E ratios for Japanese 
firms would have been lower had they been using U.S. accounting practices, 
this difference could explain neither the doubling of this ratio in 1986 nor its 
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decline in 1990. Figure 2.3 shows the movement of the Nikkei index before 
and after the crash. 
 
Figure 2.3 Nikkei Index 1950-2002 (arithmetic scale). 
 In the real estate market, prices have also followed the behaviour of 
the stock market. Land prices in Japan rose continuously from the 1950s to 
1990. In 1991, the total land value in Japan was estimated at nearly US$20 
trillion (Stone & Ziemba, 1993). This was more than 20 per cent of the world’s 
wealth. A prime location condominium in Tokyo peaked at over US$3,500 per 
square feet and was 70 per cent more expensive than the new Trump tower 
in mid-town New York (Saito, 2003). 
 By 1996, prices of land of all types nationwide had sunk back to levels 
consistent with the long-term trend of the overall economy. However, the 
speculation, which culminated in frenzied buying and selling of land, left a 
hangover of enormous proportions that has affected Japan’s economy to this 
day. Bank lending soared to record levels when prices increased but lending 
was still growing although prices subsequently fell. This debt overhang is the 
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source of the Japanese banking system’s financial difficulties today 
(Alexander, 1997).  
 If developed countries have experienced asset price bubbles, what 
about developing countries? Herrera and Perry (2003) document the 
existence of asset price bubbles in Latin American countries in their sample 
period from 1980-2001 using the rational bubble and the intrinsic bubble 
theories discussed below. Collyns and Senhadji (2003) found that asset price 
bubbles were present during the 1990s especially in the real estate markets 
of most Asian countries but their subsequent bust during the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis affected each country quite differently. 
 Thailand was heavily affected because the property price bubble was 
large and the financial system was weak. Malaysia also experienced a sharp 
decline in real estate prices and a heavy build-up in non-performing loans. 
Indonesia and South Korea both underwent severe foreign exchange and 
banking crisis, but the property sector played a smaller role, reflecting less 
obvious property price bubbles and smaller bank exposure to the property 
sector. 
 Using Australia as a benchmark, Sarno and Taylor (1999) confirmed 
the existence of asset price bubbles in East Asian economies before the 
1997 Asian financial crisis. The technique used was the residuals augmented 
least squares (RALS) method to circumvent the methodological problems as 
pointed out by Evans (1991) which will be discussed in Chapter 3. Real stock 
price series appeared to diverge rapidly away from the real dividend series, 
and often collapsing after a period of rapid price advancement and then 
proceeding again. They concluded that since Australia was not affected by 
